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Abstract 
Both the law and culture distinguish between acts of commission that overturn the status 
quo and acts of omission that uphold it. This distinction is of central importance when it 
comes to reciprocal actions. A stylized fact of everyday life is that acts of commission elicit 
stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. We report experiments that directly 
test whether this stylized fact characterizes behavior in controlled experiments. We 
compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts in experiments using binary, extensive 
form games. Across three experiments, we examine the robustness of our results to 
different ways in which the status quo can be induced in experiments. The data show a 
clear difference between effects of acts of commission and omission by first movers on 
reciprocal responses by second movers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Does it make a difference whether a bad or good outcome results from an act of commission 
or an act of omission by another person?1  In this paper we compare reciprocal responses 
to acts of commission, that actively impose harm or kindness, and acts of omission which 
represent failures to prevent harm or to act kindly. We use three experiments to test a 
hypothesis that acts of commission induce stronger reciprocal responses than comparable 
acts of omission. 
Each experiment has two treatments in which we compare the behavior in two 
games that vary in their initial endowments, which creates the distinction between the first 
mover’s acts of commission that alter the initial endowments and acts of omission that keep 
them unaltered. Importantly, we keep the terminal payoffs in both games identical. This 
gives us a clean test of the empirical significance of opportunities and payoffs that result 
from acts of commission that change the status quo versus acts of omission that preserve 
it. 
 To investigate reciprocal preferences, we focus on what happens after a first mover 
chooses to uphold or overturn the status quo, that is, what is the reaction of another person 
to this choice. Data from the experiment provide support for the importance of 
discriminating between acts of commission and omission by a first mover in theoretical 
modeling of reciprocal behavior.   
 
2. Relationship to the Literature 
We complement several established streams of literature. The work of psychologists has 
focused on the omission bias which occurs when individuals judge harmful commissions, 
such as igniting a fire, as worse than the corresponding harmful omissions, such as failing 
to extinguish or report a fire. Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991), in a series of hypothetical 
payoff experiments employing multiple decision scenarios, find that subjects’ ratings are 
associated with judgments that omissions do not cause outcomes. 
                                                 
1 For example, a waiter may be rewarded with an extremely large tip for going out of his way to serve a 
customer but might not be punished with a small tip for choosing not to fulfill an extraordinary request. 
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One of the proposed explanations for the omission bias is loss aversion (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992) and the closely related phenomenon of status quo bias (see e.g., 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990). If the status 
quo is perceived as a reference point then individuals might be motivated to maintain the 
status quo in order to avoid possible losses from overturning it. Baron and Ritov (1994) 
explore this conjecture and argue that only part of the omission bias can be attributed to 
loss aversion. In another study, Ritov and Baron (1995) examine the connection between 
omission bias and anticipated regret. Because regret is triggered by relative disadvantages 
resulting from actions rather than inactions, it imposes a natural psychological cost to acts 
of commission. 
The common feature of these psychology experiments is that they involve a single 
decision maker whose choices do not affect others. Moreover, responses in these studies 
do not have economic consequences. This stands in sharp contrast to our experiments in 
which interactions between pairs of subjects have economic consequences for both 
individuals. 
A series of recent papers examine the omission bias in the context of decisions 
affecting others and thus invoking social preferences. Hayashi (2013) finds that omission 
bias tends to be “self-serving.” In his experiment, dictators who were randomly assigned 
favorable endowments are less willing to reallocate money toward the recipient than when 
the initial endowment was less favorable. In contrast, Gärtner and Sandberg (2014) find no 
omission bias in their experiment and argue that much of this effect could be attributed to 
preference for default options. Grossman (2014) studies decisions of dictators who could 
choose to remain uninformed about the payoff consequences of their actions for the 
matched recipients. He finds that subjects strongly respond to default options – i.e., whether 
the default is set on revealing the recipient’s payoffs or keeping them hidden.  
Our paper is concerned with reciprocal behavior, not dictator game behavior. And 
we experiment with reciprocal behavior in a context in which there is no default option:  
first movers must make choices, as must second movers.  
While the economics literature recognizes intentions to be a driving factor for both 
positive reciprocity (Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008) 
and negative reciprocity (Blount, 1995; Offerman, 2002), the typical experimental designs 
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focus on the “proof of concept” that intentions matter, rather than on identifying conditions 
under which the intent behind actions is revealed. The common element of such designs is 
that they allow for the presence of intentions in one condition and remove their presence 
in the control condition by either implementing the choice of the “first mover” exogenously 
by the experimenter (e.g., Cox, 2004), using a randomizing device (e.g., Cox and Deck, 
2005), or by forcing a particular choice through limiting the choice set to a singleton (e.g., 
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003). 
Bruni, Corazzini, and Stanca (2009) vary the nature of intentions via withholding 
information that there is a second stage of the game from their subjects. Their experiment 
employs a two-stage game in which a first mover chooses how much of his 20-token 
endowment to send to a second mover. The amount sent is multiplied by 3 whereas the 
amount kept remains unchanged. In the second stage, the second mover faces an identical 
decision using his own endowment. When the first mover does not know that there is the 
second stage, the motivation for his generosity is purely intrinsic. However, when the first 
mover knows that the second mover can reciprocate his generous action, the first mover’s 
motivation can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Bruni et al. find that the second movers respond to 
possible motivation behind the first movers’ generosity and, consistently with the previous 
literature, reward them more when extrinsic motives can be ruled out.  
In a related study Brandts and Solà (2001) study the importance of perceived 
intentions and distribution of outcomes. Their experiment consists of a series of mini-
ultimatum games, in which the proposer has only two options. One of these options is held 
fixed at (380, 80), while the other option systematically (i) increases/decreases the equality 
of payoffs with respect to the fixed benchmark and (ii) varies whether the higher payoff 
goes to the proposer or the recipient. The rejection rates for the fixed benchmark are the 
lowest when the foregone option gave a lower payoff to the recipient than the benchmark 
and the highest when the foregone option gave the recipient a higher payoff than to the 
proposer and the payoffs were less asymmetric in terms of their equality than the fixed 
benchmark. In contrast to Brandts and Solà, our experimental games differ in terms of the 
status quo but keep the monetary payoffs at terminal nodes the same. 
There are some previous papers that suggest the relevance of the distinction 
between acts of commission and omission in reciprocal relationships. For instance, in the 
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labor market relationship, a wage increase is reciprocated more strongly when it is an active 
decision of the firm rather than a higher legal minimum wage (Charness, 2004). In the 
Stackelberg mini-game (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008), the Leader’s choice of quantity 
is binary and the feasible set varies with treatment: 𝑞𝐿 = {6, 9} or 𝑞𝐿 = {9, 12}. After 
learning about the Leader’s quantity decision, the Follower then chooses from the set 𝑞𝐹 =
{5, 6, … , 11}. By making a given output choice by the Leader be the smaller in one situation 
(hence more generous to the Follower) and in another situation be the larger one (hence 
less generous), this design allows for a joint test of effects of reciprocity and status quo but 
does not separately identify the effects of acts of commission or omission.2   
 
3.  Experimental Design and Protocol 
We first explain the abstract form of the game and, subsequently, explain alternative 
economic implementations of the game. In what follows we use game trees to represent 
the games, however it is important to note that in our experiments subjects were not shown 
game trees.  Subject instructions and response forms that show exactly how the games were 
presented to the subjects are contained in electronic supplementary material.  
   
3.1 Abstract Game Tree 
All of our experimental treatments involve the game that can be represented by the tree 
diagram in Figure 1a. In the ordered pairs of payoffs (a,b) at the terminal nodes, the number 
a is the dollar payoff of Player A and the number b is the dollar payoff of Player B.  Player 
A chooses Left or Right at the top node.  If Player A chooses Left then Player B has a 
feasible set with two (ordered pairs of) payoffs, both of which favor Player A.  If Player A 
chooses Right then one of the two (ordered pairs of) payoffs is the equal split where each 
player gets 10.   
   Player A may choose Left or Right based on her evaluation of the four alternative 
ordered pairs of payoffs at the terminal nodes and her expectations about Player B’s 
behavior.  Player B may make his choice between Left or Right on each branch solely on 
the basis of his evaluation of the payoffs on that branch, as predicted by purely 
                                                 
2  Other joint tests for effects of reciprocity and status quo are reported in Cox, et al. (2009), Cox and Hall 
(2010), and Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj, and Walker (2013). 
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consequentialist models of preferences. Alternatively, Player B may have reciprocal 
preferences that cause him to base his choices partly on an evaluation of the Player A 
choices that would make one side or the other side of the tree relevant for payoffs.  A 
negatively reciprocal Player B might punish Player A for moving Left, and thereby making 
the equal split unavailable, by choosing (9,3) on that side of the tree.  A positively 
reciprocal Player B might reward Player A for moving Right, and thereby making the equal 
split available, by choosing (12,9) on that side of the tree.   
 
       FIGURES 1.a and 1.b and 1.c ABOUT HERE  
 
An experiment could be run with a protocol that instantiates the game as described 
above. But such an experiment would not be able to elicit the possible behavioral relevance 
of endowments that define the status quo ante Player A’s opportunity to act. Neither could 
that approach elicit the possible relevance of acts of commission vs. acts of omission that 
are defined in relation to those endowments.  Such an approach could not elicit the possible 
behavioral relevance of differences in responses to such acts because they lead to the same 
payoffs. In order to study the behavioral significance of such distinctions we embed the 
game form in Figure 1a in two alternative economic contexts that differ in the assignment 
of endowments ex ante Player A’s opportunity to act. 
 
3.2 Endowments and Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission 
Figures 1.b and 1.c have the same ordered pairs of money payoffs at their corresponding 
terminal nodes.  However, because of the different endowments in the two games, in order 
to reach a terminal node with given money payoffs (x, y), Player A and Player B must 
choose a different sequence of actions in our two treatments. 
In the Give or Pass Game (treatment 15,5T ), shown in Figure 1.b, the first mover 
(Player A) has an endowment of 15 dollars and the second mover (Player B) has an 
endowment of 5 dollars.  These unequal endowments define the status quo ante Player A’s 
opportunity to act in this treatment.  Player A has two possible moves: she can choose “No 
Change from (15,5)”, that is make no change in the unequal endowments, or she can choose 
(to) “Give 5” out of her 15 dollar endowment to equalize the now-altered endowments at 
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(10,10).   If Player A chooses “No Change from (15,5)” then Player B has two possible 
choices: he can choose “No Decrease” or he can choose (to) “Decrease by 6” the 
endowment of Player A at a cost to himself of 2 dollars.  These possible choices in 
treatment 15,5T , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the left side (or leg) of 
Figure 1.b.  If Player A decides to Give 5 to Player B then Player B has two possible 
choices: she can choose “No Increase” or she can choose (to) “Increase by 2” the 
endowment of Player A at a cost to herself of 1 dollar. These possible choices in treatment 
15,5T , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the right side (or leg) of Figure 1.b.  
In the Take or Pass Game (treatment 10,10T ), shown in Figure 1.c, both Player A and 
Player B have 10 dollar endowments. These equal endowments define the status quo ante 
Player A’s opportunity to act in this treatment. Player A has two possible moves: she can 
choose “No Change from (10,10)”, that is make no change in the equal endowments, or 
she can choose (to) “Take 5” out of Player B’s 10 dollar endowment to imbalance the now-
altered endowments at (15,5). If Player A chooses “No Change from (10,10)” then Player 
B has two possible choices: she can choose “No Increase” or she can choose (to) “Increase 
by 2” the endowment of Player A at a cost to herself of 1 dollar.  These possible choices in 
treatment 10,10T , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the right side (or leg) of 
Figure 1.c.  If Player A chooses “Take 5” then Player B has two possible choices: he can 
choose “No Decrease” in the modified endowments or he can choose (to) “Decrease by 6” 
the modified endowment of Player A at a cost to himself of 2 dollars.  These possible 
choices in treatment 10,10T , and the money payoffs they yield, are shown on the left side (or 
leg) of Figure 1.c.   
 
3.3 Implementation as One-Shot Games 
In our experiments subjects play a one-shot game. The first mover (Player A) chooses 
between No Change and Give 5 or between Take 5 and No Change, depending on the 
game.  The second mover (Player B) is asked to use the strategy method; hence, without 
knowing Player A’s choice, Player B makes a choice conditional on each of Player A’s two 
possible choices.  Many subjects play the game in the same session. At the end of the 
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experiment, pairs of A and B player subjects are formed randomly and their choices 
determine payoffs.   
 
4.  Implications of Theoretical Models for Play in the Two Treatments 
Consequentialist social preferences models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2002; the text version of Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox and Sadiraj, 2007) 
imply that play will be the same in the Give or Pass game as in the Take or Pass game 
because they have the same end node payoffs.  The different consequentialist models may 
have different implications about which of the ordered pairs of payoffs at the terminal 
nodes will be preferred by Player B.  But all of these models represent social preferences 
in which an agent’s utility of alternative allocations of material payoffs depends only on 
the (absolute and relative) amounts of the payoffs themselves, not on the agents’ actions 
that may be necessary to generate the allocations in any particular game.  Therefore, all of 
these models imply that Player B will make the same choice between two final payoff 
allocations, (a,b) or (c,d), in treatment 15,5T  as in treatment 10,10T , thus providing a testable 
hypothesis for our experimental design. 
 
Hypothesis CP. The distribution of play across the four terminal nodes is the same 
in treatments 
15,5T  and 10,10T .  
 
Any data pattern significantly different from that specified in Hypothesis CP would be 
inconsistent with (“reject”) consequentialist social preferences models. 
Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) extends neoclassical 
preference theory to include reciprocal preferences by adding Axiom R and Axiom S.   
Many properties of revealed altruism theory and its parametric special case (Cox, 
Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007) were tested in the two cited papers. The experimental design 
in the present paper provides a direct test of the empirical content of Axioms R and S. 
Axiom R implies that Player B’s preferences are more (resp. less) altruistic if Player A 
moves Right (resp. Left) in either of our treatments because the feasible set {(10,10), 
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(12,9)} is more generous (to Player B) than the feasible set {(15,5), (9,3)}.3  Axiom S says 
that the effect of Axiom R is stronger when a generous (or ungenerous) act overturns the 
status quo than when the same act merely upholds the status quo. Together, Axioms R and 
S imply that Player B’s preferences are most altruistic when Player A moves Right in game 
15,5T  (a generous act of commission) and least altruistic when Player A moves Left in game 
10,10T  (an ungenerous act of commission).  Neoclassical preference axioms together with 
Axioms R and S imply that more Players B will prefer (“No Decrease”, “Increase by 2”) 
for strategy method response in treatment 15,5T  than in treatment 10,10T .  In this way, the 
axioms of revealed altruism theory imply an alternative to Hypothesis CP, which is: 
 
Hypothesis SQ. The frequency of play of nodes with payoffs (15,5) and (12,9) is 
greater in  treatment 15,5T  than in treatment 10,10T . 
 
Any data pattern significantly different from that specified in Hypothesis SQ would be 
inconsistent with (“reject”) the empirical implications of the axioms of revealed altruism 
theory. 
An interesting question is whether data from our treatments can be used to test 
psychological game theoretic models.  The most likely candidate is the widely-used model 
of sequential reciprocity in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Application of the 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (D&K) model to our 15,5T  and 10,10T  games reveals that any 
pattern of Player B behavior would be consistent with that model.4  Hence data from our 
treatments cannot be used to test the D&K model. In contrast, the stylized facts about 
behavior contained in data from our experiments (reported in section 6) could inform an 
                                                 
3 Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008) defines a partial ordering of feasible sets (More Generous Than) and a  
partial ordering of preferences (More Altruistic Than).  Axiom R states a relationship between the two 
partial orderings. See the cited paper for formal development of the theory.   
4  The authors appreciate the generosity of Martin Dufwenberg in engaging in detailed private 
communication about the D&K model.  A detailed explanation of why any pattern of Player B behavior in 
our experiment would be consistent with the D&K model is available from the authors on request.  An 
extension of our experimental design to include beliefs elicitation could have testable implications for the 
D&K model.   
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extension of the D&K model in which perceptions of what is “kind” are made dependent 
on the (status-quo) endowment of the game. 
 
5. Three Experiments 
Out in the field the status quo arises naturally from established property rights.  In a 
laboratory setting, however, subjects encounter stylized decision problems in which they 
often lack clear ex-ante expectations.  In our experiments three different design features 
are used to induce status quo: 
(i) Initial endowments: subjects start off playing the game with initial money 
balances of $15 or $5 in treatments 15,5T  and $10 each in treatments 10,10T .  
Feasible actions are possible changes in these initial money balances. 
(ii) Labeling of actions: we label actions that do not cause any change in payoffs 
as “no change in payoffs” and actions that lead to changes in payoffs as 
“give/take x” or “increase/decrease by y”. 
(iii) Entitlements: in Experiment 1 the initial endowments are assigned 
randomly.  In Experiments 2 and 3 endowments are earned.  We use a two-
day experimental procedure which has subjects earn their monetary 
endowments in a real-effort task on Day 1 of the experiment.  Experiment 
2 employs a tournament format in which higher endowments are received 
for better performance.  In Experiment 3 we randomly assign subjects into 
different sessions and ask everyone in a given session to attain the same 
target performance level.  The higher the target level in a session, the higher 
the amount earned.  
The first two design features complement one another and provide a natural way of 
establishing the status quo. By (i) and (ii) the status quo (our treatment variable) is set by 
the initial endowments that will subsequently be changed or preserved by Player A via 
feasible actions.  As for feature (iii), ex ante it is not clear whether the strength of property 
rights interacts with the labeling of actions as “give” or “take” and “decrease” or 
“increase”. Several previous studies have found a notable effect of earned vs. randomly 
assigned endowments on subsequent behavior in dictator games (Cherry, Frykblom, and 
Shogren, 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008), bargaining games (Hoffman, McCabe, 
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Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Rutström and Williams, 2000), public good games (Clark, 2002 
and Harrison, 2007) and other games involving reciprocal considerations (Danková and 
Servátka, 2015). Experiments 2 and 3 therefore serve as robustness checks with respect to 
the procedure by which entitlements are induced. Their designs mimic two common labor 
market compensation practices, tournaments and absolute performance targets.  
In addition we used a two-day format that separates the earnings task from the 
strategic play of the game.  The intention was to give subjects some time to “bond” with 
the earnings so they better perceive them as their own property rather than “house money” 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Cárdenas, De Roux, Jaramillo, and Martinez, 2014; Danková 
and Servátka, 2015)   
 We conducted four one-day sessions in Experiment 1, six two-day sessions in 
Experiment 2 and five two-day sessions in Experiment 3.  The treatments were 
implemented in a between-subjects design. All sessions were run manually using the 
strategy method (Selten, 1967; Brandts and Charness, 2011). 
Experiment 1 presents a test in which initial endowments (and thus also the roles) 
were randomly assigned by the experimenter. In what follows we refer to Experiment 1 
treatments as RANDOM 15,5T  and RANDOM 10,10T . In treatment RANDOM 15,5T  subjects 
play Give or Pass Game 15,5T  with endowments (15, 5), presented in Figure 1.b and in 
treatment RANDOM 10,10T  they play Take or Pass Game 10,10T  with endowments (10, 10), 
presented in Figure 1.c. 
 In Experiment 2 subjects compete in a tournament which places them in three 
different groups based on their relative performance in the quiz. Individuals with better 
performance receive higher endowments. The subjects were recruited for a two-day 
experiment.  On Day 1 of the experiment each participant was asked to answer the same 
set of 40 math questions, selected from the GMAT test bank. The quiz score was the 
number of questions the subject answered correctly minus 1/4 of a point for each incorrect 
answer. After everyone completed the computerized quiz (programmed in Visual Basic), 
the final scores were ranked from the highest to the lowest and ties were resolved randomly. 
Once the complete ranking of the participants had been determined, the participants who 
scored in the top 25% received an IOU certificate for $15, those in the middle 25-75% 
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received a $10 certificate, and those in the bottom 25% received a $5 certificate.  These 
certificates provided the endowments for Day 2 participation.  Subjects who earned $15 or 
$5 were invited to the same session on Day 2 while subjects who earned $10 were all 
invited to a session that started at a different time on Day 2. 
The two different Day 2 sessions constituted our experimental treatments 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  and TOURNAMENT 10,10T . Day 2 sessions used procedures 
identical to Experiment 1 with the only difference that the endowments were earned on 
Day 1.  In treatment TOURNAMENT 15,5T  this implied that the roles were also determined 
based on subjects’ performance on Day 1.  In treatment TOURNAMENT 10,10T  the subjects 
were assigned to be either Player A or Player B in a random way. 
In Experiment 3 (treatments TARGET 15,5T  and TARGET 10,10T ) subjects 
performed the same earning task of solving GMAT problems, except that their assignment 
to roles was random.  On Day 1 of the experiment participants were asked to correctly 
answer 10, 20 or 30 problems, depending on which session they were recruited for.  There 
was no penalty for providing an incorrect answer and no time limit; everyone completed 
the earnings task in their session.  For reaching one of the three target performance levels 
they received an IOU certificate for $5, $10, or $15, respectively. These certificates 
provided the endowments for Day 2 participation.  The rest of the procedures were identical 
to Experiment 2. 
All sessions were held in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. A total of 416 undergraduate subjects 
participated in the study.  On average, a one-day session lasted about 60 minutes including 
the initial instruction period and payment of subjects.  A two-day session lasted about 120 
minutes.  The experimental earnings, denoted in $, were converted into cash at the 3 to 4 
exchange rate: $3 (or 3 lab $) equals 4 New Zealand dollars, henceforth NZD.  In 
Experiment 1 subject payments included a 5 NZD show up fee. In Experiments 2 and 3 the 
show up fee was 10 NZD (i.e., 5 NZD for each of the two days), all paid at the end of the 
Day 2 session. The payoff protocol was double blind.   
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6. Results 
As the main focus of the current paper is on a particular aspect of reciprocal behavior, we 
begin by first presenting the behavior of B Players in Table 1 and defer the discussion of 
A Player’s behavior until the next section. 
 
6.1 Tests for Differences in B Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments 
Recall that B Players’ choices were elicited by the strategy method.  Each Player B thus 
made two choices, one for each of the two subgames.  However, we cannot simply compare 
the choice-frequencies at the terminal nodes because use of the strategy method makes the 
choice data not independent across nodes within a subgame.  Nevertheless, each subject’s 
chosen strategy (a pair of choices, one for each subgame) is an independent observation.  
Therefore, we first classify the behavior of each subject into one of four possible strategies: 
1. No Decrease-No Increase (ND-NI); 2. No Decrease-Increase by 2 (ND-IB2); 3. Decrease 
by 6-No Increase (DB6-NI); 4. Decrease by 6-Increase by 2 (DB6-IB2).  Then, we run 
Fisher’s exact test on the strategies rather than the choices.    
To assess the impact of earned endowments on Player B reciprocal responses, we 
compare their behavior in the respective treatments using the data presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We begin by testing the impact of endowment protocols in the 15,5T  treatments.  Fisher’s 
exact tests, reported in the first two rows of Table 2 reveal that there are no differences in 
B Players’ behavior whether their endowments represent a windfall gain and are randomly 
assigned or earned in a tournament or by reaching a target performance (p=0.897 and 0.882, 
respectively).  Given that, it is not surprising that the (tournament or target) type of earning 
procedure does not influence their decisions (p=0.606).  A similar pattern emerges for the 
10,10T  treatments where the respective p-values are 0.488, 0.500, and 0.520, suggesting that 
a random assignment of endowments was sufficient to establish strong enough property 
right entitlement effects on subjects’ reciprocal behavior. Moreover, it also provides 
evidence that the tournament procedure in Experiment 2 did not incidentally select 
different reciprocal types into different treatments based on their GMAT performance. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
6.2 Tests Using Pooled Data 
Given that we do not find any differences in B Players’ behavior across the three 
experiments, we pool all data and perform tests for the overall effect.  Table 3, split into 
panels, presents data and statistical tests from individual Experiments 1-3 as well as pooled 
data on Player B’s behavior according to the distribution of play. As can be easily seen 
from the table, the data are consistent with reciprocity. Our next question is whether the 
observed difference in play between the two games is statistically significant. We compare 
Player B’s behavior in two ways: (i) for the whole game tree; and (ii) for corresponding 
subgames. 
As before, we run Fisher’s exact test on the strategies rather than the choices. This 
implements the test of the null (Hypothesis CP) that the distribution of play across the four 
terminal nodes is the same in treatments 15,5T  and 10,10T .  The test rejects the null in favor 
of Hypothesis SQ with very high significance (p<0.001). 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
A tougher test of Hypothesis SQ would be to test its implication in each individual 
subgame.  In particular, for the subgame on the left side of the game tree it implies that the 
frequency of “Decrease by 6” will be higher in treatment 10,10T than in 15,5T .  The one-sided 
Fisher's exact test detects a statistically significant difference between frequencies with 
which the Decrease by 6 choice was selected in the two treatments (p=0.011).  For the 
subgame on the right side the prediction is the frequency of Increase by 2 is higher in 
treatment 15,5T  than 10,10T .  The one-sided Fisher's exact test detects a statistically significant 
difference (p<0.001). 
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6.3 The Effect of Endowment Allocation Procedures on A Players’ Behavior 
We next briefly discuss the differences in A Players’ behavior who show a great sensitivity 
to procedures under which the initial endowments were allocated.  Table 4 summarizes and 
compares their behavior in our three experiments.  We observe a significant difference in 
A Players’ behavior between the two treatments in all three experiments (p=0.001 for 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. RANDOM 10,10T ; p=0.016 for TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  and p=0.09 for TARGET 15,5T  vs. TARGET  10,10T ).  We also find 
a significant difference in frequencies of choosing to Give 5 between RANDOM 15,5T  
treatment, where the windfall initial endowments were assigned randomly by the 
experimenters, and treatments TOURNAMENT 15,5T  and TARGET 15,5T  where the 
endowments were earned (p=0.028 and p=0.004, respectively). The evidence that A 
Players were less generous when they had to earn their endowments is in line with previous 
findings by Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), and 
Carlsson, He, and Martinsson (2012).  We do not find any differences in A Players’ 
behavior between TOURNAMENT and TARGET treatments (p=0.614). 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Comparison of treatment RANDOM 10,10T  with TOURNAMENT 10,10T  and 
TARGET 10,10T  reveals that the frequency of Take 5 is higher when the endowments are 
assigned randomly than when they are earned (p=0.001 and p=0.028, respectively), 
indicating that A Player subjects honor property rights created by performance in the math 
quiz.  Despite the fact that there appears to be more taking when the endowments were 
earned by reaching a target output than in a tournament (50% vs. 34.3%, respectively), the 
Fisher’s exact test does not detect a significant difference between TOURNAMENT 10,10T  
and TARGET 10,10T  treatments (p=0.232). 
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7. Discussion 
We have reported three experiments with two instantiations of a simple two player game. 
The respective terminal node payoffs are the same in the Take or Pass Game as in the Give 
or Pass Game. But the games begin with different endowments and require different actions 
to arrive at the same payoff. The endowment for a game is the status quo ante Player A’s 
choice between No Change — an act of omission that preserves the endowment — and 
Give or Take — an act of commission that changes the endowment to the profit of one 
player and cost to the other.  Most importantly, the left-hand subgame in one treatment is 
selected by Player A’s selfish act of commission (Take 5) while in the other treatment it is 
selected by making No Change in the endowment. Similarly, the right-hand subgame in 
one treatment is selected by a generous act of commission (Give 5) while in the other 
treatment it is selected by making No Change in the endowment.  
 Our data analysis mainly focuses on second mover behavior. Does reciprocal 
behavior vary in predictable ways in response to acts of commission versus acts of 
omission in our experiments?  Our answer is “yes”. Data from the experiment provide 
support for the importance of discriminating between acts of commission and omission by 
a first mover in theoretical modeling of reciprocal behavior.  The data support the 
prediction in Hypothesis SQ that in our treatments (see Figure 1): The frequency of 
observation of nodes with payoffs (15,5) and (12,9) is greater in  treatment 15,5T  than in 
treatment 10,10T . This pattern of play reflects central features of revealed altruism theory 
(Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008); if we had observed any other pattern of play, the 
empirical relevance of that theoretical model would have been called into question.  That 
model had previously performed well in tests using data from several types of experiments 
reported in papers by various researchers.5  But the experiment reported herein is the first 
                                                 
5  The model has previously done well with tests of data obtained from experiments reported in Huck, 
Muller, and Normann (2001), Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003), Cox (2004),  Cox, Friedman, 
and Sadiraj (2008),  Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. (2009), Cox and Hall (2010), and Cox, Ostrom, Sadiraj, 
and Walker (2013).   
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one designed to stress-test the idiosyncratic implications of the model’s Axioms R and S 
that account for Hypothesis SQ.6   
The primary difference between Experiment 1 and Experiments 2 and 3 is the 
saliency of entitlements to endowments.  Based on previous experimental evidence on 
earned endowments and behavior, we conjectured that earned endowments could be key 
to the intensity of reciprocal reactions towards acts of commission.  In everyday life the 
money in one’s wallet is in most cases earned and regarded by the owner as being well 
deserved.  People routinely exchange their time and effort for wages to which they form a 
strong sense of ownership or entitlement.  In the laboratory, we cannot ask subjects to play 
with their own money and therefore entitlements are not easily established. In our 
Experiments 2 and 3 we approached this problem by splitting the experiment into two days 
and having subjects earn their endowments on Day 1 of the experiment.  Not only did the 
subjects have to work for the endowments but they also had some time between the earning 
part and the game part to develop a sense of ownership of their earnings (Strahilevitz and 
Loewenstein, 1998).  Earned endowments significantly affected giving and taking by first 
movers but to our surprise did not have a significant effect on second movers’ reciprocal 
responses.   
Our data show that subjects with reciprocal preferences are quite sensitive to acts 
of commission, i.e., acts that overturn the status quo.  In our experiments we have 
developed a procedure that makes the status quo salient rather naturally.  It involves an 
experimental design with specification of endowments and feasible actions that make acts 
of commission, such as giving or taking, stand in contrast with acts of omission, such as 
not giving or not taking when there is an opportunity to do so. 
One can ask whether this approach would be generally effective for establishing a 
status quo in experiments. Experience, habits, customs and norms are likely to play an 
important role in some contexts. From this perspective field experimentation might be 
another fruitful avenue for future research on the empirical significance of acts of 
commission vs. acts of omission.  The field has the advantage that both the status quo and 
                                                 
6 There may be other models that are also capable of rationalizing both the data reported herein and the data 
from the many experiments included in the papers listed in footnote 5, but that is a question beyond the 
scope of the present paper.   
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entitlements to endowments arise naturally.  However, the complexity and richness of the 
field environment might make it difficult for researchers to identify the status quo 
conditions that are perceived by participants. 
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     Table 1. Raw Data on B Players’ Behavior Categorized According to Strategies 
 
 Strategies 
Treatment ND-NI ND-IB2 DB6-NI DB6-IB2 
RANDOM 15,5T  
n = 33 
16 10 5 2 
RANDOM 10,10T  
n = 34 
19 1 13 1 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  
n =35  
14 13 5 3 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  
n = 35 
20 4 9 2 
TARGET 15,5T  
n =35  
17 8 7 3 
TARGET 10,10T  
n = 36 
15 4 15 2 
 
POOLED DATA 15,5T  
n =103 
47 31 17 8 
POOLED DATA 10,10T  
n = 105 
54 9 37 5 
ND = No Decrease; DB6 = Decrease by 6; NI = No Increase; IB2 = Increase by 2 
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Table 2.  Tests for B Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments 
 
Tests for 15,5T Treatments 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TOURNAMENT 15,5T  0.897 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.882 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.606 
 
Tests for 10,10T Treatments 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TOURNAMENT 10,10T  0.488 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.500 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.520 
All Fisher’s tests reported in Table 6 are two-sided. 
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Table 3: Player B Behavior  
 
Panel A: Experiment 1 
 No Decrease Decrease by 6 No Increase Increase by 2 
RANDOM 15,5T  26/33 (78.8%) 7/33 (21.2%) 21/33 (63.6%) 12/33 (36.4%) 
RANDOM 10,10T  20/34 (58.8%) 14/34 (41.2%) 32/34 (94.1%) 2/34 (5.9%) 
Fisher’s Test for 
Strategies 
0.004a 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames 
0.067 0.002 
Panel B: Experiment 2 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  27/35 (77.1%) 8/35 (22.9%) 19/35 (54.3%) 16/35 (45.7%) 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  24/35 (68.6%) 11/35 (31.4%) 29/35 (82.9%) 6/35 (17.1%) 
Fisher’s Test  
for Strategies 
0.061a 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames 
0.296 0.01 
Panel C: Experiment 3 
TARGET 15,5T  25/35* (71.4%) 10/35* (28.6%) 25/36 (69.4%) 11/36 (30.6%) 
TARGET 10,10T  19/36 (52.8%) 17/36 (47.2%) 30/36 (83.3%) 6/36 (16.7%) 
Fisher’s Test  
for Strategies 
0.211a 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames 
0.084 0.133 
Panel D: Pooled Data on B Players’ Behavior  
15,5T  78/103*  
(75.7%) 
25/103*  
(24.3%) 
65/104  
(62.5%) 
39/104  
(37.5%) 
10,10T  63/105  
(60%) 
42/105  
(40%) 
91/105  
(86.7%) 
14/105  
(13.3%) 
Fisher’s Test  
for Strategies 
0.000a 
Fisher’s Test for 
Subgames 
0.011 0.000 
a two-sided test. 
* One Player B did not provide an answer on the left side of the game tree. 
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Table 4.  Comparison of A Players’ Behavior across the Three Experiments 
 
 
15,5T  10,10T  
 
Give 5 
No Change 
from (15,5) 
No Change  
from (10,10) 
Take 5 
Experiment 1: RANDOM assignment 21/33 (63.6%) 12/33 (36.4%) 8/34 (23.5%) 26/34 (76.5%) 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. RANDOM 10,10T  0.001 
 
Experiment 2: TOURNAMENT  12/35 (34.3%) 23/35 (65.7%) 23/35 (65.7%) 12/35 (34.3%) 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  
0.016 
 
Experiment 3: TARGET  10/36 (27.7%) 26/36 (72.3 %) 18/36 (50%) 18/36 (50%) 
TARGET 15,5T  vs. TARGET  10,10T  0.09 
 
Tests for 15,5T Treatments (Give 5) 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TOURNAMENT 15,5T  0.028 
RANDOM 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.004 
TOURNAMENT 15,5T  vs. TARGET 15,5T  0.614 
 
Tests for 10,10T Treatments (Take 5) 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TOURNAMENT 10,10T  0.001 
RANDOM 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.028 
TOURNAMENT 10,10T  vs. TARGET 10,10T  0.232 
All Fisher’s tests reported in Table 4 are two-sided. 
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